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I.  INTRODUCTION: KOPPELMAN’S “PURITAN MISTAKE” 
In his essay, Religious Liberty as Liberty, Douglas Laycock cautioned 
against what he would later dub “the Puritan mistake,”1 which is the mistake, 
as he put it, of looking at whether religion is a good (or bad) thing rather 
than seeing religious liberty as “first and foremost a guarantee of liberty.”2  
We should not, Laycock warned, let our understanding of the religion 
clauses be driven by what we think, substantively, about the value of 
*  Assistant Professor of Law, St. Louis University School of Law; J.D., Yale Law School, 
2007; M.A., Ph.D. in Philosophy, University of Chicago, 2004.  I am grateful to Micah 
Schwartzman, John Inazu, William Baude, Christopher Lund, Michael McConnell, Andrew 
Koppelman, and Christopher Bradley for comments and conversations on earlier drafts.  Thanks to 
Chris Jones and Sam Dickhut for their usual excellent research help.  All errors are my own.  This is 
a response to Andrew Koppelman’s And I Don’t Care What It Is: Religious Neutrality in American 
Law, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1115 (2013), and a part of Pepperdine University School of Law’s February 
2012 conference entitled, The Competing Claims of Law and Religion: Who Should Influence 
Whom?. 
 1.  Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313, 353 
(1996) [hereinafter Laycock, Religious Liberty]; see also Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty: Not 
for Religion or Against Religion, but for Individual Choice, UT LAW, Spring 2004, at 42, available 
at http://www.utexas.edu/law/magazine/wp/wp-content/uploads/magazine/archive/utlaw_spring04.pdf. 
 2.  Laycock, Religious Liberty, supra note 1, at 313. 
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religion.3  It should be driven, instead, by an interest in protecting the 
freedom of religion, and not religion per se.4 
Although Andy Koppelman positions himself in much the same 
conceptual space as Laycock, I think he makes (and would probably admit to 
making) a version of the “Puritan mistake.”  Koppelman says that he is 
interested in avoiding the extreme of radical secularism that favors “the 
complete eradication of religion from public life” but also the extreme of 
religious traditionalism, which sees nothing wrong with “frank endorsement 
of religious propositions.”5  
Koppelman, like Laycock, wants to find a way between these two 
extremes.  But instead of rejecting the traditionalist view outright, 
Koppelman instead insists that religion is a good thing (this is the Puritan 
mistake), but—partly in a bid to appease the secularists—that religion ought 
to be defined at a very high level of abstraction.6  We can affirm, in 
Koppelman’s phrase, “religion in general,” but not any religion in 
particular.7  In short, the Puritan mistake was, in a way, a particularly 
Puritan mistake; the Puritans made the error of supporting religious freedom 
only for Puritans.8  They should have instead supported “religion in 
general.” 
It’s a neat trick, if it works: Koppelman can have his cake and eat it too.  
He defends the value of religion without defending the value of any religion 
in particular.  And his solution is neat on another level as well, because it 
defends a practical answer to a theoretical puzzle.  The theoretical puzzle is: 
How can the state possibly support religion, even give it special protection, 
but remain neutral?  The practical answer Koppelman offers is simply to 
look at American practice and see what we have done.9  It seems impossible 
that a state could promote religion and be neutral, but in America we have 
done it, surprisingly.  In practice we have done what seems to be impossible 
in theory. 
As a theorist, I find this result unsatisfying and more than a little 
depressing, and I find myself wanting to put pressure on Koppelman from 
both sides.  I want to say, with the radical secularist, that Koppelman’s 
abstract “religion in general” is too much like religion to be neutral; but I 
also want to say, with the religious traditionalist, that religion in general may 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Andrew Koppelman, And I Don’t Care What It Is: Religious Neutrality in American Law, 39 
PEPP. L. REV. 1115, 1121 (2013) [hereinafter Koppelman, Religious Neutrality]. 
 7.  Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 90 (2002); see also Koppelman, 
Religious Neutrality, supra note 6, at 1126. 
 8.  Laycock, Religious Liberty, supra note 1, at 353. 
 9.  See Koppelman, Religious Neutrality, supra note 6, at 1117–32. 
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not capture perfectly what many (or most) of us mean by religion.  So I want 
to try putting Koppelman between the traditionalist and the secularist—
between Scalia and Rawls, as it were—and see where we end up. 
II.  KOPPELMAN’S “MASTER CONCEPT”: THE FLUIDITY OF NEUTRALITY 
Koppelman’s “master concept,” the one which inspires the new book he 
has been working on for many years, is that neutrality is not a fixed thing 
which we can define once and for all, but is actually a fluid concept.10  More 
particularly, there are various levels of neutrality, and before we dismiss the 
idea of neutrality tout court we have to grapple with the idea that neutrality 
as something less than absolute neutrality might be a very useful concept.  
For instance, someone could like baseball, but be neutral about whether 
there should be a designated hitter or not.  Or (a little closer to our topic) 
someone could favor state support of the arts, but not support any particular 
type of art: the state could fund dance, or music, or impressionist paintings, 
or abstract paintings.  Or a state could promote religious belief, but not any 
particular religious belief; it could promote “religion in general.” 
“Religion in general” is also an important concept for Koppelman: it 
may go hand-in-hand with the fluidity of neutrality as his key concept.  The 
two, of course, are importantly related, because Koppelman believes that 
religion in general is the appropriately “neutral” level at which we should 
support religion.  The state remains neutral on religion so long as it only 
backs “religion in general,” and not anything more or less abstract than that. 
As Koppelman is well aware, one might argue that state support for 
religion in general, in fact, is the wrong level of neutrality.  For religion in 
general is at least one level of abstraction above the idea that the state can 
support monotheistic religion and not just religion in general.  And one 
might think that support for a generic monotheism is the right level of 
neutrality for America.  In fact, Justice Scalia, as Koppelman notes, has 
endorsed this view in at least one opinion;11 although he has said conflicting 
things in other opinions.12  Justice Story may have also held such a view, 
indeed, perhaps an even narrower one: that Christianity could receive special 
protection and encouragement from the state, but not any one particular 
 10.  See id. at 1127; see also Andrew Koppelman, The Fluidity of Neutrality, 66 REV. POL. 633 
(2004) (discussing this theory at length). 
 11.  Koppelman, Religious Neutrality, supra note 6, at 1126 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 
577, 641 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 12.  Id. at 1127 (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 
748 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
DO NOT DELETE 1/9/13  2:41 PM 
 
1142 
sect.13  This is, we might say, two levels below Koppelman’s favored level of 
religious neutrality.  Scalia might even face a powerful objection from Story 
that he has made his concept of religion too abstract. 
It is important to see, and I think that Koppelman would concede, that 
Scalia’s and Story’s views are also varieties of religious neutrality.  Scalia is 
neutral as to the monotheistic religions,14 and Story is neutral as to the 
various sects of Christianity.15  But Koppelman rejects both of these views 
because they do not adequately capture the right kind of neutrality.  He says 
that they are not abstract enough, even though they might have been the 
right kind of neutrality at earlier stages in our nation’s history (as 
Koppelman might also grant).16 
So the innovation of the fluidity of neutrality can only get us so far, 
because the real debate will not be whether any of these conceptions are 
“neutral,” because all of them can be considered as varieties of neutrality.  
You cannot just pound your fist on the table and say your conception is 
“more neutral” than all the others.  This is one main reason that I think it is 
probably advisable to give up on neutrality as a useful concept, because the 
real work, the work that goes into getting your conception to be accepted as 
the “neutral” one, goes on elsewhere.  The real question is not whether we 
should be neutral at all, but what level of neutrality we should aspire to.   But 
how do we answer this question?   
III.  CAN WE FIND THE RIGHT LEVEL OF NEUTRALITY? 
As I see it, there are two general ways of deciding which level of 
neutrality is appropriate—that neutrality means religion in general, say, 
rather than neutrality about monotheism or neutrality about Christianity.17  
The first way is to look at existing societal consensus.  The correct level of 
neutrality will be the one where the most people agree.  If most people agree 
that the state can support “religion in general” then that is neutral, or at least 
neutral enough.  The second way is through theory.  We might provide some 
more abstract theoretical method for determining what kind of state support 
for religion (if any) would be permitted.  One such method would be John 
Rawls’s idea that we can only justify the state’s use of its coercive power if 
 13.  Laycock, Religious Liberty, supra note 1, at 323–24; see also 1 JOSEPH STORY, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 701 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) (stating that the 
real object of the Establishment Clause was “to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects”). 
 14.  See Koppelman, Religious Neutrality, supra note 6, at 1126. 
 15.  1 STORY, supra note 13, at 701. 
 16.  See Koppelman, Religious Neutrality, supra note 6, at 1125–26. 
 17.  Id. at 1127; McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005). 
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it is based on reasons that no person could reasonably reject.18  I consider 
these two methods in turn. 
A.  Social Consensus? 
If the standard for neutrality is societal consensus or “the convergence 
of a contingent set of actual views,”19 then how are we to determine this 
consensus?  By poll?  If so, then Scalia may be closer to what is “neutral” 
than Koppelman is.  Scalia notes that monotheists make up nearly ninety-
eight percent of those practicing a religion in America.20  This, of course, 
does not say what Americans think about what religions should be protected 
or (to phrase the question in a more accurate way) what they think is 
religion, and thus worth protecting.  And this is a poll only of believers, and 
so it may be somewhat biased, although it seems fair to include only self-
ascribed religious believers in the category of the religious. 
More to the point, if there was a poll asking whether Americans thought 
the state should protect religion in general, it is hard to say what the results 
would be or what most Americans take religion to be.  Would they agree that 
atheism is a religion?  Koppelman says that we know what religion is when 
we see it;21 then again, who are “we”?  I am not so sure, or not as sure as 
Koppelman, that ceremonial deism is revanchist, rather than an attempt to 
express contemporary attitudes about majority religious belief; deism may 
be the tip of a more substantial iceberg, not simply the fragments of a dying 
(sub)culture.22 
In a way, this is not where I want to press Koppelman, although it is 
close to it.  Koppelman rejects Scalia’s understanding of neutrality, saying 
that it “does not work, because it discriminates among religions;”23 and later, 
he says that Scalia does “not appreciate the fluidity of neutrality.”24  But 
Scalia might insist that of course he does, he just understands the level of 
neutrality required by the “convergence of a contingent set of [our] actual 
 18.  Rawls calls this the “liberal principle of legitimacy.”  See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM 136–37 (2005). 
 19.  See Koppelman, Religious Neutrality, supra note 6, at 1126. 
 20.  Id. at 1127; McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 894 (2005) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 21.  Koppelman, Religious Neutrality, supra note 6, at 1121–22. 
22.  See also Richard W. Garnett, Neutrality and the Good of Religious Freedom: An Appreciative 
Response to Professor Koppelman, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1149 (2013).
 23.  Koppelman, Religious Neutrality, supra note 6, at 1127 (emphasis added). 
 24.  Id.  
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views” to be different than Koppelman does.25  This again shows that 
invocations of the fluidity of neutrality are just as likely to start disputes as 
to settle them. 
If Koppelman says that Scalia (or at least a suitably theorized version of 
Scalia26) is wrong about the correct level of neutrality as an empirical matter, 
he has to explain more about how we understand how to fix that level, and 
why Scalia is wrong about what “most people” believe, or why what “most 
people” believe isn’t enough for neutrality.  Does there have to be 
unanimity?  If there does, then surely there isn’t unanimity about “religion in 
general” either, as I elaborate below.  Further, Scalia does not rest his 
argument about consensus merely on polling data alone: he says that support 
for monotheism in general is based in America’s history and tradition, as 
well as in the text of the Constitution.27 
Saying Scalia is wrong because his view “discriminates” against 
religions does not sound like Koppelman is merely accusing Scalia of 
miscounting noses, or getting our history wrong.  Rather, Scalia makes 
something akin to a conceptual mistake, by defining what religion is too 
narrowly.  His understanding of religion as monotheism may reflect a 
consensus of sorts; in fact, Scalia may be right about what our actual 
consensus about religion is.  But Scalia’s understanding of that consensus 
might not provide us with the best characterization of our existing practices, 
which would lead us (Koppelman intimates) to a broader definition of 
“religion.”   
But to speak of the “best characterization” of our views puts us beyond 
the actual convergence of our points of view: it represents a step toward 
theory.  We look at our actual views, and reflect on what is the best 
characterization of them: something which builds on, but is not reducible to 
what our actual views are.  If Scalia gets his characterization wrong, then we 
need a theory to say where he goes wrong: we can’t just point to the fact that 
he excludes some beliefs that some would call religious.28  As the old saying 
goes, it takes a theory to beat a theory.29  
 25.  Id. at 1126. 
 26.  I am not much interested, in this particular essay, in getting the actual Scalia right. 
 27.  McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 886–89 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 28.  Scalia, after all, could claim that Koppelman’s definition includes some beliefs that should 
not be interpreted as religious beliefs. 
 29.  See Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 053: It Takes a Theory to Beat a Theory, 
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2006/08/legal_theory_le_1.html (last modified June 
19, 2011). 
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B.  Theory?   
This brings me to the second answer that we might give to the question 
of how to specify the right level of neutrality, which is that we decide what 
the right level of neutrality is as a matter of theory and not (merely) as a 
matter of practice or social consensus.  Koppelman briefly discusses Rawls 
in this light, and I follow him in this.30  Koppelman, I take it, would agree 
that promotion of monotheism, as opposed to religion in general, might be 
“reasonably rejected” by those who have nontheistic religious beliefs.31  But 
if this is true, then we also have to ask: could some reasonably reject the idea 
that religion in general is good, and deserves protection? 
The answer to this, I think, is clearly yes.  Some undoubtedly think 
religion (in general, or in a specific instantiation) is bad and ought to be 
abolished.32 Certainly as a theoretical matter, the special protection of 
religion is, at the very least, something upon which reasonable people can 
disagree.   
More directly, some people might reasonably reject that religion can be 
promoted or privileged; they might even say that about “religion in general,” 
and they surely will say it about exemptions to religious belief.  Some will 
reject religious exemptions across the board;  are they not just mistaken but 
unreasonably so?  And are they being unreasonable if their only ground for 
rejecting the special treatment of religion is simply because it is unfair to 
favor religion in general over other modes of belief or ways or life?  If they 
think that protection for religion in general won’t work “because it 
discriminates”?33  I am hard-pressed to see how they would be unreasonable 
in claiming this.  Surely they can say that promotion or protection of religion 
in general is controversial just as much as nontheistic religious believers can 
(rightly) assert that promotion of monotheism is controversial.   
 Koppelman might reply to the atheist’s objection by saying that the 
atheist too might be a proponent of a “religion in general.”  But if even the 
atheist counts as adhering to a variant of “religion in general”34 then surely 
we have lost any firm grasp of what is distinctive about the good of religion, 
 30.  Koppelman, Religious Neutrality, supra note 6, at 1124–26. 
 31.  Again, I take the idea of reasonable rejection from Rawls. 
 32.  See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, GOD IS NOT GREAT: HOW RELIGION POISONS 
EVERYTHING (2007). 
 33.  Koppelman, Religious Neutrality, supra note 6, at 1127. 
 34.  Or even if we can coherently conceive of the atheist as believing something rather than just 
not believing in something (i.e. in God or the sacred). 
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and even the good of religion in general.35  There ends up being no real light 
between “religion in general” and what Rawls would call a “comprehensive 
doctrine,” or a view of the world that can be religious, philosophical, or 
moral.36  The route of theory gives Koppelman no real support for his 
understanding of “religion in general,” anymore than the route of social 
consensus did.   
Can there be a third way?  
IV.  CONCLUSION: GIVING UP ON NEUTRALITY 
Koppelman, in his contribution to this issue,37 can be a little vague 
(perhaps deliberately so) about the value of religion in general and how 
religion has a distinct value over other conceptions of the good.38  He says in 
one place that religion gives us hope,39 but so do many other things.40  What 
he means to say, or should mean to say, is that religion gives us a special 
kind of hope, a hope that transcends the mundane.  This is a type of good 
that cannot be captured by secular theories: it suggests that no matter the 
appearances, the world, as such, is just, or at least tends towards justice.  I do 
not think a secular theory can give any sense to this type of hope—what we 
might call a hope in the transcendent.41   
If religion is a good, it is (as Koppelman observes elsewhere42) a very 
distinct kind of good and not simply the sum total of all good religiously-
inspired acts and attitudes.  And if religion is a good, a real good, then it is 
doubtless a very important good, worthy of protection.  Moreover, if the 
state promotes this good, it is not simply saying that many people believe 
religion is a good and so we protect it (people believe all sorts of things are 
good, but not all of them get or deserve protection) or that the people who 
believe religion are particularly intense about it (again, people are intense 
about all sorts of things, but not all of them get or deserve protection); 
rather, it is saying that religion is good, period.  Any sound defense of 
 35.  It is relevant that in the quote that gives Koppelman’s essay its title, Eisenhower was talking 
about not caring about what religion people had; he did not say that it was important that people 
believe something, and it did not matter what it was.  Eisenhower, in his own way, was trying to pick 
out the uniqueness of religion. 
 36.  RAWLS, supra note 18, at 37; see also Micah Schwartzman, What If Religion Isn’t Special?, 
U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=1992090. 
 37.  Koppelman, Religious Neutrality, supra note 6. 
 38.  Id. at 1137; see also Andrew Koppelman, Is It Fair to Give Religion Special Treatment?, 
2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 571 [hereinafter Koppelman, Is It Fair?]. 
 39.  Koppelman, Religious Neutrality, supra note 6, at 1130–31. 
 40.  America’s past history of overcoming division and discord may give us hope, the example of 
great men and women may give us hope, and so on.   
 41.  See generally CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE (2007). 
 42.  See Koppelman, Is It Fair?, supra note 38, at 593. 
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religious liberty will, I think, make Laycock’s “Puritan mistake” at some 
level.  Maybe not necessarily at the level the Puritans made it, but at some 
level. 
I do not think, in articulating and ultimately defending this good, we are 
helped by saying that we are promoting religion (even religion in general) in 
a neutral way.  It defers the problem without addressing it, because it does 
not get us around the implications of making the Puritan mistake.  Some will 
legitimately object that any promotion of religion is nonneutral, even at a 
very high level of abstraction.  They are right, I think, to say that there is no 
sound reason to stop at that level of abstraction, if we are speaking solely in 
terms of neutrality.  The Rawlsians can say, just as Koppelman says to 
Scalia, that anything less than their level of neutrality “discriminates.” 
We are better off, I think, giving up on neutrality as a term of art and 
simply arguing directly in terms of religion’s distinct value: we protect 
religion not because we are being neutral, but because of the value of 
religion as such.43  Those who deny that religion has any distinct value will 
have to say that religion is not relevantly different from believing anything 
else.  At the limit, they may say that religion does more harm than good, or 
that religion is simply false.  Those who believe in the value of religious 
liberty qua religious liberty will have to have answers to these questions.  
This is the debate that the Enlightenment, in part, was about, and I do not 
think that there is any way we can get around it by talking about neutrality.  
There is no muddling through it, not in theory, and not in practice either. 
 43.  For further elaboration of this point, see Chad Flanders, The Possibility of a Secular First 
Amendment, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 257 (2008). 
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